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Introduction -The rise of China and its role in the global economy
China's economic growth since the 1980s has been enormous. The Chinese growth miracle has been fueled by a large investment share coupled with strong growth in exports. Even during the global financial crisis, with the global economy sliding into recession and global trade collapsing, the Chinese economy was able to post healthy growth rates. Many other emerging markets have also grown rapidly in recent years, which has shifted the balance of power in the global economy towards middle-income countries and away from highincome OECD countries.
This change in the composition of global output and trade makes analysis of the larger emerging markets, and especially China, even more important than before. Our contribution concerns the role of China in the global economy, but also the effects of the global economy on China. At the same time we aim to address a question that so far has received scant attention in the literature, namely China's impact on the Central and European countries. Many of these countries have also grown rapidly in the last few years, but unlike China they suffered from large output losses during the 2008-2009 economic crisis.
Many of these countries also remain potential competitors for China, which makes the analysis interesting.
The rise of the Chinese economy is accompanied by a steady increase in its trade integration with the world economy. Figure 1 depicts the share of trade (goods imports and exports) with China in total trade over the period from 1995 to 2011. The graph illustrates a surge in China's trade integration with Asia, especially with Japan, whose the share in China trade bounded from 10% in 1995 to 25% in 2011. Trade integration with other large economies such as the US, India, Brazil and Russia rose to around 10% in 2011, while that of the euro area increased to about 5%.
[FIGURE 1 TO BE INSERTED HERE] There are several studies that examine the impact of macroeconomic shocks on China, but there are only a few that embed the Chinese economy into a global context.
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On one hand, trade and consequently the relocation of productivity based on comparative advantage, fosters economic growth across the globe. On the other hand, the recent global financial crisis produced evidence of the danger of stress spilling over via the trade channel. It is thus natural to study the impact of macroeconomic shocks by means of a global model that includes the interdependencies among the economies. There are two recent studies that look at the impact of an increase in Chinese real output on the world economy, using a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model. Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2011) demonstrated the growing importance of China for the region of Latin America. In particular, they show that the impact of a positive shock to Chinese output has increased almost threefold compared to the same shock in the context of the 1990s' trade flows in accounting for the integration of China with the world economy. In the same vein, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2011) demonstrate that the response of the Latin American region to a shock emanating from the US has halved as a consequence of the rise of China in the world economy.
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Using the same empirical framework, Dreger and Zhang (2011) trace the impact of a +1% change in Chinese GDP on inflation and real economic performance in the industrialized countries. Their results show that the impact on output is substantial for the Asian region, while the effects on the US economy and the euro area are less pronounced.
In this paper we first study the impact of a shock emanating from the Chinese economy on the real economies of emerging markets, particularly those in Eastern Europe.
For that purpose we extended the country coverage of the data set used in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2011) and Dreger and Zhang (2011) , to include 52 advanced and emerging economies.
Secondly we look at potential threats to the Chinese growth miracle by examining a revaluation of the renminbi as well as a hike in oil prices. The paper is structured as follows.
The next section briefly introduces the empirical framework. Section 3 presents the data and model specification along with a range of empirical tests, to ensure the model's statistical verity. In Section 4 we introduce four macroeconomic shocks and examine their spatial and dynamic propagation. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical approach -the GVAR model
The global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model is a compact representation of the world economy, which highlights the economic and financial interdependencies in the global economy. The GVAR model has been successfully employed in the study of propagation of macroeconomic shocks (see e.g. Dees et al., 2007 , Pesaran et al., 2004 , Pesaran et al. 2007 ) and financial stress (Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011 and Sgherri and Galesi, 2009 2 For an excellent textbook exposition of the GVAR see Garrat et al. (2006) .
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The system of equations comprises information about both the longrun , and short-run, . Note that Π x = 0, which means that information from the conditional model for is redundant for . Furthermore, this assumption implies that the vector of foreign variables is not cointegrated (Assenmacher-Wesche and Pesaran, 2008) . The way common stochastic trends are accounted for in the GVAR resembles a cointegration system approach akin to Johansen (1995) .
Should the domestic variables be cointegrated, the 'long-run' matrix Π is rank deficient, which in turn prevents straightforward economic interpretation of the coefficients describing the long-run equilibrium.
In the second layer of the GVAR framework, the single-country models are 'stacked' to yield a coherent global macro-model that is able to capture the dynamics and spatial propagation of macroeconomic shocks to the system: with H and containing the stacked coefficient matrices from the single countries and . contains the stacked weighted coefficients, i.e.,
. The models are thus linked via which is a matrix with being the sum of endogenous and weakly exogenous variables in country model i and is the total number of endogenous and weakly exogenous variables in the system. As is evident from above the matrix, is a crucial element of the GVAR framework in the sense that it links the single country models and thus governs the propagation of a shock. Note that the weigths in need not match those used to construct the foreign variables. Since the square matrix G is non-singular, equation (2) 
Model Specification and Specification Tests
Based on trade weights, foreign variables are constructed to account for global and regional factors. Economic activity seems to be generally assumed to be the channel via which spillovers take place. However, spillovers could in principle take place via any of the domestic variables. For degrees of freedom considerations, we aim at keeping the number of variables per country small. We thus allow for spillovers via real GDP (y*) and interest rates (stir*, ltir*) only. Note that co-movements of these variables are strong, with cross-sectional correlations ranging from 0.5 (short-term interest rates) to 0.9 (real GDP), while cross-country correlation of inflation is rather low ( The number of the long-run relationships is tested by means of the trace statistic test (Juselius, 2006) . The trace statistic is preferred to the maximum eigenvalue statistic since it has better small sample properties (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2011) . In order to achieve a parsimonious model and ensure stability of the global model, we examine the long-run
properties for each country model in more detail. More specifically, we assess the dynamics of a global shock 6 to the country specific long-run equilibria by means of persistenceprofiles (see Pesaran et al., 2003) . Following Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2011) the cointegration rank has then been reduced as long as the economy is restored to an equilibrium within 10-15 quarters. Note that we have set the lag length for domestic, foreign and global variables to one in equation (1). Finally, the modeling of the global variable (oil prices) is discussed in detail in the next section. Table B .1 in the appendix summarizes the specification for each country model.
Our final model passed several specification tests. First, it is globally stable in that all its roots lie either on or inside the unit circle. Secondly, we tested whether the foreign variables can be considered as weakly exogenous. The results provided in Table B .2 show that weak exogeneity is by and large met in all the country models. Finally we carried out an F test for residual serial correlation (Pesaran et al., 2004) . Although our hands are tied in the sense that increasing the number of lags in the GVAR would require longer time series, we feel that testing for autocorrelation in a time series model is necessary. Of the 220 equations in the model, 161 pass the F test for first order serial autocorrelation, which
gives us further confidence in the statistical properties of the model.
Macroeconomic Shocks
We are interested in propagation of three different macroeconomic shocks in the global economy and their impact on the real economy 7 :
1. A +1% shock to Chinese GDP
2.
A +1% shock to US GDP
A +50% increase of oil prices
Besides assessing the dynamics of a shock locally, the GVAR framework allows us to trace out the spatial shock propagation. For this purpose we follow the bulk of the literature in employing the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) put forward in Pesaran and Shin (1998):
with s j denoting a binary shock indicator vector, n the shock horizon, Σ u the corresponding variance covariance matrix of the GVAR and . As noted in Pesaran and Shin (1998) the generalized impulse responses are not sensitive to the ordering of the variables in the country models -in contrast to the standard VAR analysis. However, this comes at the cost of having non-orthogonalized impulse responses. That is, shocks cannot be isolated since the variables in the system are typically correlated. Lastly, note that the dynamic analysis in a GVAR is carried out on the levels of the variables, which implies that the effects of a given shock are typically permanent.
Shock to China's output
We first assess the impact of a positive +1% shock to real Chinese output to the global economy that is depicted in Figure 2 . The initial shock translates into a 1.2% permanent increase of GDP in the Chinese economy. The long-run boost to Chinese real output goes in parallel with a decrease in inflation and an increase in the short-term interest rate. This particular behavior of the Chinese economy with regard to the shock transmission is in line with findings of Chen et al. (2012) .
[ Table 1 . Note that the results are aggregated to make the exposition simpler. 8 The 1% increase in Chinese GDP translates to a 0.2% permanent increase for output in Latin America, followed by a somewhat smaller effect on the CEE region. Surprisingly the results for the Asian region are smaller, which could be seen as an indication of competition in the region.
Shock to US output
To obtain a benchmark for the China real GDP shock, we conduct a +1% shock to US real output. The initial shock translates to a 1.2% increase in US real GDP in the first year and 1.3% in the long-run. In contrast to the Chinese economy, inflation ticks up, and both short and long-term interest rates increase. One particular feature of the US country model is that it includes oil prices as an endogenous variable. The strong US economy spurs the demand for oil, which is mirrored in a remarkable 15% increase in oil prices in the long-run.
The dominance of the US economy can also be seen in the response of other countries' real output to the growing US economy. The results are shown in 
Shock to oil price
Thirdly, we look at the response of the global economy to a +50% hike in oil prices. On the one hand, positive oil price shocks are expected to deter economic activity in oil importing countries by dampening the global economy. On the other hand, oil price hikes are expected to boost real GDPs of oil exporting countries, with the potential for spillovers to countries with which they have strong economic ties. Following the literature we opted to model the oil price as an endogenous variable in the US country model. This might be justified since the US is the dominant economy in the GVAR system as well as among the largest oil producers, and is by the far the largest oil importer. 8 Results for the single countries are available from the authors upon request.
In contrast to Dees et al. (2007) and Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2011), we opted for excluding oil prices as a conditioning variable from the long-run equilibrium. Thus oil prices are assumed to have a short-run influence on the domestic variables only. We relax this assumption for the largest oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Russia, US, Norway, Canada, Mexico, Nigeria and Azerbaijan) and importers (euro area, China and India) where oil price is included as an additional foreign variable.
The effect of the +50% increase in oil prices is shown in Figure 4 .
[FIGURE 4 TO BE INSERTED HERE]
As expected, the Russian economy sees a permanent and large increase in real GDP. After 10 quarters, real output in Russia rises by 6%. This result is in line with Korhonen and
Ledyaeva (2010) The Latin American region displays a rather contained response, while the Asian economies show a slightly positive reaction. Strikingly, the Middle East-African countries react negatively to the oil price hike, although Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, which together make up close to 40% of the regional aggregate, are both important oil exporters. Investigating the respective country models reveals that oil prices negatively influence the short run GDP dynamics, which seems counterintuitive at first sight. However, as a consequence of the global recession oil prices were declining in 2009, while Saudi Arabia and Nigeria both were relatively sheltered from the crisis. This might partially account for the negative association of oil prices and GDP growth in these countries.
The countries belonging to the SEE and CEE region are all oil importers. Consequently the oil price hike translates to a permanent drag on real output that amounts to 1%.
This negative effect is reinforced by the drop in output in the euro area, which comprises the countries' largest trading partner. On the other hand, trade ties with Russia slightly mitigate these negative effects.
Conclusions
We assessed the role of China in the global economy with the help of a GVAR model. Our primary focus was on the effects of Chinese economic performance on other emerging market countries in different parts of the world, an issue that has not so far received attention in the literature. Furthermore, our GVAR model has larger country coverage and is estimated on a more recent data sample than other models attempting to tackle similar issues.
We find that developments in the Chinese economy have very clear and often large effects on other countries. For example, Brazil, which has increased its exports to China tremendously during the past decade, is perhaps the largest outside beneficiary of higher Chinese GDP. Usually those countries or country groups trading more with China will benefit from higher Chinese GDP, but China's smaller neighbors in Asia are a partial exception to the rule. However, we need to remember that the US economy, roughly three times the size of the Chinese economy, still exerts the strongest influence on other countries.
As China and other large emerging markets have grown, so has their demand for raw materials. To proxy for this trend, we have examined a large positive shock to the price of oil. As expected, this has a retarding effect on the growth of most oil-importing countries, while oil-exporters (especially Russia) benefit. Interestingly, China is the largest sufferer from this shock to oil price.
Our results emphasize the pre-eminent role the large and open Chinese economy has assumed in recent years. China's economic fortunes have large effects on other countries, developed and developing alike. As China's growth continues, these effects will only become more pronounced and closer in magnitude to the current impact of the US economy. Coverage refers to the availability of a particular variable in all the country models of the GVAR, in %.
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Appendix C -Shocks to the Real Exchange Rate
As a robustness check, we also model effects from a revaluation of the Chinese renminbi.
The nominal exchange rate of the renminbi has appreciated over the sample period by about 20% versus the USD and by about 40% versus the euro. In the same period, the average annual growth rate of real output was close to 10%. There is an intense debate on whether the Chinese growth miracle was partially fueled by the undervalued renminbi and how large the potential undervaluation of the renminbi might be. While most of the empirical contributions suggest that the renminbi has been undervalued in recent years (Feng and Wu, 2008) , others seem conclude the reverse (Cheung et al., 2007) . Korhonen and Ritola (2011) provide a meta-analysis of studies on the renminbi's misalignment vis-à-vis its equilibrium value. They find that the renminbi may have been undervalued, especially against the dollar, but the degree of this undervaluation has decreased in recent years. In a recent contribution, Zhang and Sato (2012) show that the effect of a revaluation of the renminbi on China's trade balance is very limited. The trade balance in China seems to be largely determined by world demand.
On top of that, the literature on the direct impact of a renminbi revaluation on real output is scarce. Cheung et al. (2012) show that Chinese exports are well-behaved in the sense that they rise with foreign GDP and fall when the renminbi appreciates. However, imports often behave counterintuitively -responding positively to a depreciation of the renminbi and negatively to an increase in Chinese GDP. García Herrero and Koivu (2008) arrive at the same conclusion as to the link between imports and exchange rate, which they attribute to the special role of processing trade in China.
In the context of a GVAR model, the interpretation of currency shocks is notoriously difficult. Since there is no foreign counterpart of the real exchange rate variable that soaks up cross-country correlation in the system, cross-country residual correlations of the marginal models for real exchange rates are typically non-negligible 9 . Given these caveats and noting the backdrop of not having data on exports and imports available, we try to assess the impact of a Chinese revaluation with two different shocks.
Given that the nominal exchange rate (vs USD) has been broadly stable over the last few years (Zhang and Sato, 2012), we induce a small shock to the renminbi-USD cur- 9 The mean of the average pair-wise cross-country correlations of the residuals from the marginal model for the real exchange rate is 0.2, standard deviation 0.13. rency pair. The response of the Chinese economy to a 3% appreciation of the renminbi (deflated by national price levels) is as follows: In the first quarter, real activity ticks up by 1%, while in the long-run real output increases markedly, by 3%. Abstaining from a structural interpretation, we note that renminbi appreciation parallels an increase in the domestic short-term interest, while inflation declines sharply. The real exchange rate itself appreciates by 7.5% in the first year and by 10% in the long-run (after 5 years).
[FIGURE 5 TO BE INSERTED HERE]
The rise in Chinese output does not leave the other countries unaffected. The US and the euro area display increases in real output of close to 0.3 to 0.4%, while the increase for Japan is slightly more contained. Among emerging economies, Russia shows the largest response, with output edging up by close to 1% in the long-run. Real output in the CEE and the SEE region increases in the long-run by about 0.3%, while output in the CIS region is rather resilient to the shock. Consistent with our previous findings examining the positive shock to Chinese real output, the response of Asian countries is somewhat negative. Taken at face value, these results would suggest that a sizeable exchange rate appreciation in China would be welfare-enhancing for almost everyone in the global economy. However, the problems mentioned above (e.g. Cheung et al. (2012) and García Herrero and Koivu (2008)) regarding exchange rate, imports and GDP in China are almost certainly affecting our empirical results.
Lastly, we also implemented a renminbi revaluation shock from a European perspective, to gain a better understanding of the issue at hand. For that purpose we carried out a 10% depreciation shock to the euro (deflated by national price levels) vis-à-vis the USD. The size of the shock was calibrated to match the long-run appreciation of the renminbi carried out in scenario 3 above. In fact, the 10% depreciation of the euro (on impact)
translates to a permanent 10% depreciation of the euro versus the USD in real terms. If we assume that the renminbi remains tightly linked to the USD, this translates to a 10% appreciation of the real exchange rate of China versus the euro in the long-run.
[ The SEE and CIS countries show the expected negative response to a depreciation of the euro, while the CEE countries show a positive response. That is, the euro area's increase in output spreads to the CEE region, thus outweighing the loss of competitiveness for the region due to the real depreciation of the euro. The Latin American region seems to benefit from a depreciation of the euro, which again might be attributed to the particular time period of our sample. In particular, the Mexican economy. which is by far the region's largest country in terms of economic activity, reacts strongly to foreign GDP. This strong reaction might have been reinforced by the fact that the economic crisis hit the US, Mexico and the euro area in a highly synchronized manner, while the other Latin American countries have been more resilient. That is, this general strong reaction of Mexico to foreign GDP, which is reinforced by an increase in US GDP as a consequence of the euro depreciation, might explain the positive response of the Latin American regional aggregate to a depreciation of the euro.
Comparing these two exchange rate shocks, it is clear that China's exchange rate policy has a decisive influence on the shock transmission. Also the problems regarding the link between imports and exchange rate mentioned earlier will have an effect on our estimations as well.
As the renminbi has been linked to the US dollar in one way or another practically throughout the sample period, the effects from euro shock may be more indicative of a shock e.g. to China's real effective exchange rate, especially since the euro area has been China's most important trading partner for most of that time. 10 By contrast, the shock to the euro has a more structural interpretation, which is reflected in the clear and predicted effect on Chinese output. 
